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Abstract
I examine the way a relevant conceptual novelty in mathematics, that is, the notion of group, has been constructed in order 
to show the kinds of heuristic reasoning that enabled its manufacturing. To this end, I examine salient aspects of the works 
of Lagrange, Cauchy, Galois and Cayley (Sect. 2). In more detail, I examine the seminal idea resulting from Lagrange’s 
heuristics and how Cauchy, Galois and Cayley develop it. This analysis shows us how new mathematical entities are gener-
ated, and also how what counts as a solution to a problem is shaped and changed. Finally, I argue that this case study shows 
us that we have to study inferential micro-structures (Sect. 3), that is, the ways similarities and regularities are sought, in 
order to understand how theoretical novelty is constructed and heuristic reasoning is put forward.
Keywords Heuristics · Hypotheses · Inference · Inferential micro-structures · Logic · Discovery
1 Introduction
In this paper I examine the construction of the concept of 
group in mathematics in order to discuss fundamental heu-
ristic procedures. This concept and its history have been 
studied extensively (see e.g. Barnett 2010, 2017; Birkhoff 
1937; Chakraborty and Chowdhury 2005; Chowdhury 1995; 
Kleiner 1986, 2007; Ronan 2006; Wussing 1984), so I will 
approach it from a heuristic viewpoint, that is, by focus-
sing on the heuristics that gradually have led generations 
of mathematicians to its formation and refinement, and I 
will consider what we can learn from it. To this end, I will 
examine specific aspects of the works of Lagrange, and then 
I will look at how these seminal works have been developed 
by Cauchy, Galois and Cayley in order to produce a mature 
group theory. In more in detail I will examine the heuristic 
reasoning of Lagrange’s work (Sect. 2.1), its development 
in the works on permutations by Cauchy, the introduction 
of the notion, and term, of groups provided by Galois, and 
then the first abstract treatment of group produced by Cayley 
(Sect. 2.2).
This analysis enables us to shed light on mathematical 
practice and to show how the manufacturing of the group 
concept displays paradigmatic features of the core of 
problem-solving, that is, the generation of a new hypoth-
esis. To provide a bit more detail, I will examine how a 
new mathematical term, and concept, are introduced (i.e. the 
term group, groupe in French) and I will discuss if this case 
study agrees with major accounts of this issue, in particular 
I will look at Lakatos (1976); Grosholz (2007); Grosholz and 
Breger (2000); Cellucci (2013, 2017). I will also consider 
the notion of solution to a problem, or better what counts as 
a solution, and the way it changes.
Tellingly, this examination enables us also to shed light 
on the very first steps that make possible the formation of 
a heuristic procedure and then of a hypothesis, what I call 
‘inferential microstructures’. These microstructures, basi-
cally, are similarities and local regularities. I will show how 
these fundamental microstructures, that is, the ways simi-
larities are sought and constructed, enable the formation of 
basic ampliative inferences. Therefore, I will argue (Sect. 3) 
that in order to account for scientific discovery and heuristic 
reasoning we have to examine its ‘micro-structures’, that is, 
to deepen our understanding of a different level of analy-
sis of the inferential processes, the one that makes heuris-
tic rules possible and applicable, as these rules presuppose 
them. Since these microstructures shape the construction 
of ampliative inferences, such as analogies, a better under-
standing of them would enable us to better understand the 
way pieces of information are introduced into the target of a 
problem and that the target did not contain at the beginning 
of the process.
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2  A Fine‑Grained Analysis 
of the Manufacturing of Groups
The concept of group, and later of abstract group, was intro-
duced and developed in order to solve a long-standing math-
ematical problem: to find an exact solution (not an approxi-
mate, that is, a numerical) to polynomials and polynomial 
equations1 of a single variable x.
This problem can be dated back to ancient Greek math-
ematics, in particular geometry. In fact, several geometrical 
problems, such as ‘doubling the cube’ (Or Delian problem)2, 
can be translated into modern algebraic symbolism—in this 
case  x3 = 2, namely a cubic equations. The search for a solu-
tion to those problems has been a powerful heuristic engine, 
as:
1. New mathematical entities were generated during the 
process;
2. What counts as a solution to a problem was reshaped;
3. The process built upon an initial ambiguous use of new 
terms and concepts, like the word ‘group’.3
To provide a bit more detail, as concerns (1), new curves 
like conic sections (i.e. parabolas, hyperbolas and ellipses) 
were introduced and studied by the Greek mathematicians 
in order to construct the line segments that could solve the 
geometrical problems, as problems like the Delian one is 
not solvable by using compass and straightedge, and many 
ingenious solutions where found by Greek mathematicians 
(e.g. Archytas, Menaechmus, Nicomedes, Diocles) looking 
for intersections of curves in space.
As concerns (2), the idea of what is an admissible solu-
tion to this problem changed over time. While for ancient 
Greek and, later, Islamic mathematicians, a negative number 
cannot be considered a solution (i.e. coefficients or roots 
of a polynomial), the introduction of complex numbers 
removed this constraint, reshaping the problem and its pos-
sible solutions.4
As concerns (3), the introduction of a new concept often 
goes through the search for a new term to express it and its 
novel content. A stock example is the Latin term acies used 
by Euler in his study of polyhedron formulas as noted by 
Lakatos (1976, p. 6). In effect a key to Euler’s result was 
just the introduction of the concepts of vertex and edge: he 
pointed out that, besides the number of faces, the number of 
points and lines on the surface of the polyhedron determines 
its topological character. To substantiate this novelty, Euler 
introduced the term ‘acies’ (edge) instead of the old latus 
(side), since latus was a polygonal concept while he wanted 
a polyhedral one.5 Euler’s introduction of a new property 
and term was crucial in the search for (topological) invariant 
for a polyhedron. A new term, especially at the beginning of 
its usage, can be ambiguous since it can be imported from 
other domains and the meaning and content of the source 
affect the target.
2.1  Lagrange’s Heuristics
In order to solve the problem of finding an exact solution to 
polynomial equations, the Italian mathematician Giuseppe 
Lagrangia (Joseph Lagrange) produced the hypothesis of 
a relation between permutations and the solution of equa-
tions by radicals. This hypothesis is the keystone of Galois’s 
theory and, in general, of the construction of the mathemati-
cal treatment of groups.
How did he produce this hypothesis? In order to answer 
this question we need to examine the heuristic procedures 
employed by Lagrange, which will reveal two crucial aspects 
of heuristic procedures:
1. The construction of ‘inferential microstructures’ and 
then primitive heuristics over them;
2. What counts a solution to a problem.
Lagrange’s first heuristic move was to look for similari-
ties, that is, common features of the known solution methods 
for specific polynomials—quadratics, cubics, and quartics6: 
1 That is a polynomial that has been set equal to zero—e.g. 
x2 + 7x + 5 = 0.
2 This problem requires, once provided the edge of a cube, finding 
the edge of a second cube whose volume is double that of the first (by 
using only the tools of a compass and straightedge), in modern alge-
braic symbolismx = 3
√
2 .
3 Another interesting issue that characterizes this process (which we 
do not have room to treat here) is the heuristic role of new symbol-
isms. Partial solutions discovered in the sixteenth century increas-
ingly made use of symbolism in a way that made possible theoretical 
questions to be posed and answered by mathematicians. For example, 
the refinement of the algebraic symbolism also allowed questions 
about the relation of roots and factors to be formulated and pursued 
(see Barnett 2010, p. 2 on this point).
4 To provide a bi more detail, first, negative solutions were accepted, 
thus extending the domain of integers to the negative axis, so that, 
e.g., every first-degree equation in the normal form ax + b = 0 (even 
with positive coefficients a, b) has a solution. Then, by observing that 
second-degree equations, like e.g.  x2 + 1 = 0 have no solutions even in 
the extended realm of negative numbers, a further extension to com-
plex numbers was introduced.
5 He retained the term angulus solidus (solid angle) for his point-like 
vertices.
6 For instance the methods of Cardano, Tschirnhaus, Euler, Bezout 
for cubics; and the methods of Cardano, Descartes, Tschirnhaus, 
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“I examined and compared the principal methods known 
for solving algebraic equations” (Lagrange 1808, p. 1884, 
my translation). This analysis of several features of known 
solutions showed one common property: “I found that the 
methods all reduced, in the final analysis, to the use of a 
secondary equation called the resolvent” (Ibid.). That is, he 
found the existence of a secondary equation (the resolvent) 
whose roots would allow us to find the roots of the originally 
given equation. In other words, the solutions of the ‘reduced’ 
(or ‘resolvent’) equation are functions of the roots of the 
equation to be solved.
For instance, given a cubic equation (that is, 
 ax3 + bx2 + cx3 + d) with three roots  x1,  x2,  x3, there is a 
reduced equation whose roots take values y = 1
3
x1 + α2x2 + αx3 
and where α3 = 1, and α ≠ 1. Thus, Lagrange noticed that 
as y3 takes just two values as the three roots are permuted, 
it satisfies a quadratic equation, which is just the resolvent 
of the cubic. A similar property can be found for quartics 
 (ax4 + bx3 + cx2 + dx + e). In fact, given a quartic with four 
roots  x1,  x2,  x3,  x4 there is a resolvent whose roots are values, 
for instance, of y = 1
2
(x1x2+x3x4). Thus, Lagrange noticed 
that as y takes just three values as the four roots are per-
muted, it satisfies a cubic equation.
In order to find these similarities he needed to manipulate 
the several sources (in this case, known methods of solution) 
in specific ways. In more detail, he sought for several ways 
of representing the ‘resolvents’ and tried to assimilate them. 
Thus, constructing a new representation is the first, decisive 
heuristic move. This change of representation allows us to 
find similarities, and then to build a inferential ‘microstruc-
ture’, that is the first tentative content of a inference, which 
can be a basis for primitive heuristic rules such as analogies 
and inductions. In effect, Lagrange’s next heuristic move, 
after the similarities were found, was to try to generalize the 
suggested solution over all the possible cases of polynomial 
equations (i.e. a induction). In this way, he also reshapes the 
problem, as he aims at a unifying approach, and not simply 
at solving specific, small classes, of polynomial equations.
The starting point of his analysis is an algebraic prop-
erty that is well-known at that time, namely the relationship 
between the roots and the coefficients of an equation. Here 
I will recall only the fundamental steps7 of the analysis that 
led him to the formulation of his main hypothesis, that is, 
the idea of permuting roots.
1. Starting from relationship between the roots and the 
coefficients of an equation, the next step is to show 
(Lagrange 1808) that given the general equation  xm−
Axm−1+Bxm−2−Cxm−3+… = 0, with its m roots  x1,  x2; 
 x3,…,  xm, for the coefficients A, B, C, we have that:
  Then, Lagrange notices that in the coefficients A, 
B, C,…, as the roots  x1,  x2,x3, …,xm are permuted, the 
formal value of the expression does not change8: the 
expressions resulting from this particular permutation 
of the given roots are formally equivalent to the original 
expressions. This occurs with every possible permuta-
tion of the roots for cubics and quartics.
2. In order to find a resolvent, that is, an equation whose 
solution would enable us to find an algebraic solution 
of the original equation, Lagrange (1808) argues that 
we can use the following economic method: first find 
the form of all the roots of the sought equation, then 
compose this equation by means of its roots.
3. He then shows how the permutation of the roots of the 
original equation in the formula for the resolvent’s roots 
produces as many as m! resolvent roots for m = 3 (i.e. 
cubes). Of course, since m! > m for m > 2, Lagrange’s 
conclusion that an equation of degree m has a resolvent 
of degree m! not only offer no solution but also fails even 
to make progress toward one.
4. In order to overcome this difficulty, he argues the we can 
reduce the resolvent’s degree by looking at some ‘invari-
ant’9 in its roots and that the key to reducing the degree 
of the resolvent in the general case will be to consider 
the form of these roots, t = x1 + ax2 + a2x3 + a3x4+…
+am−1xm, and the effect of permutations on this form.
Unfortunately, this line of argument faces several difficul-
ties even with relatively small values of m. In effect, even if a 
resolvent for a quintic equation can be reduced from degree 
120 (5!) to degree 24 (4!), 24 is still considerably larger than 
the original equation’s degree of 5. Similarly, for quartics, 
the initial resolvent degree of 4! = 24 that can be reduced 
only to 3! = 6.
As we know nowadays, these difficulties cannot be over-
come in this way. Nonetheless, Lagrange’s heuristic strategy 
paved the way to the construction of a novel approach and 
A = x1 + x2 + x3 +…+ xm;
B = x1x2 + x1x3 +…+ x2x3 +… ;
C = x1x2x3 +… ;
7 For a detailed analysis see in particular Wussing 1984; Barnett 
2010, 2017.
8 For instance, for m = 2, by exchanging  x1 with  x2 we have that 
A = x2 + x1 and B  x2x1. Both are equal to the original expressions, 
where A = x1 + x2 and B = x1x2.
9 The invariance is expressed by Lagrange (1770) by saying that the 
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concept in mathematics. Before examining it, it is worth not-
ing that another interesting aspect of Lagrange’s heuristics 
is the use of a trigonometric representation as an attempt of 
determining the roots of polynomials. This heuristic move, 
which produces another inferential microstructure, namely 
an assimilation of roots and points on a unit circle, is par-
ticularly important as it raises the issue of the solution to a 
problem, or better what can count as a solution to a problem. 
In effect, the use of a different representation raises the ques-
tion of whether, and when, a specific representation is legiti-
mate or admissible. The ways by which we set up a problem 
and represent it embed an idea of its possible solution, since 
these ways put specific constraints on the problem-space, 
that is the moves, the operators, and the intermediate states 
of our problem.
The geometric representation of roots, that is, roots of 
unity as points on the unit circle, was known in Lagrange’s 
era and he employed it in order to find the total number and 
type (i.e. real or complex) of mth roots of unity (Lagrange 
1770). To provide a bit more detail, given a unit circle (i.e. 
with radius set equal to 1) on the complex coordinate system 
(see Fig. 1), the roots of unity, e.g. cube roots, fifth roots, 
etc., can be found by dividing the circle respectively into 
three, five, etc., equal parts.10
Therefore, the task of finding roots of unity is reduced to 
the inscription of polygons within the unit circle—a triangle 
for cube roots, a pentagon for fifth roots, etc. (see Fig. 2), 
where the roots are points in the circle.11
This representation is controversial. As Lagrange himself 
noticed, equations like xm−A = 0, or more simply xm—1 = 0 
(i.e.  xm=1), are “always solvable by trigonometric tables in 
a manner that allows one to approximate the roots as closely 
as desired, by employing the known formula
and letting k = 1, 2, 3,…, m” (Lagrange 1770, p. 168). 
This formula is obtained from the polar, or trigonometric, 
form of complex numbers, which is one of the three forms 
by which we can represent a complex number. Unfortu-
nately this approach does not work in general: a trigono-
metric function can be assimilated to an algebraic solution 
of polynomials only if the specific trigonometric values can 
be expressed in an algebraic form.12
This holds not only for this specific case: what counts 
as a solution to polynomials has been set up differently in 
different times. To illustrate this, let us think of the well-
known example of the algebraic solution provided by the 
mathematician Omar Khayyam. He explicitly solved cubic 
equations by intersecting appropriate conic sections, that is, 
in a geometrical way, but not counting negative numbers as 
coefficients or roots of equations, since negative numbers 









−1Fig. 1  Roots of unity on a complex coordinate system
Fig. 2  Inscription of several 
polygons within the unit circle
12 By ‘algebraic form’ we mean that the roots of a given equation can 
be determined from its coefficients by means of a finite number of 
steps that involve only elementary arithmetic operations (+; −, ×, ÷), 
and the extraction of roots.
10 The roots of unity are all found on the unit circle, as they must 
have modulus equal to one. Now, every point on the unit circle can 
be identified by an arrow starting at the origin of coordinates and 
pointing at it. This arrow creates an angle alpha with the real axis 
(called argument of the complex number). Each multiplication of a 
root by itself rotates its arrow counterclockwise by the same angle 
alpha. So the m-roots of unity are such that after rotating m times by 
alpha one gets back to the point x = 1, i.e., m alpha = 360°, which has 
exactly m distinct solutions  alphak=(k/m) 360°, with k = 0,…, m−1. 
Increasing k we aobtain solutions that are equivalent, e.g. k = m gives 
alpha = 360° which is the same arrow as alpha = 0, k = m + 1 gives 
alpha = 360° + 360°/m, which is the same arrow as alpha = 360°/m, 
and so on.
Footnote 10 (continued)
11 The roots are the points on the circle: their values have a real part 
and an imaginary part, and are measured respectively along the hori-
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not an admissible solution, the search for a solution was con-
strained by this piece of knowledge and, as a consequence, 
the construction of the problem-space was affected by it. Of 
course the introduction and acceptance of complex num-
bers changed this: by allowing different kinds of solution the 
problem-space was shaped in a different manner.
This raises an important point about the notion of solva-
bility, which can be set up in ways that can change over time. 
This change basically depends on the way we represent, and 
also not represent, a problem. Since a representation is built 
on inferential microstructures, that is similarities and local 
regularities, this means that the shape and boundaries of the 
problem-space can be modified, that is, extended or limited, 
by the production of specific inferential microstructures. 
Euler’s solution to Basel problem is a stock example in this 
sense: when he provisionally admits as legitimate the rep-
resentation of power series as trigonometric functions, this 
removes implicit constraints on the problems and changes 
the construction of the problem-space (see Ippoliti 2008).
Thus, we are now in a position to extract interesting fea-
tures from Lagrange’s heuristic strategy. In sum, Lagrange’s 
heuristics can be broken down into the four following steps:
 (s1) Change the ways of expressing the target of a problem, 
that is, of some of its features.
 (s2) Look for similarities between ways of expressing the 
target of a problem or with other pieces of knowl-
edge—that is, generate inferential microstructures.
 (s3) Use these microstructures to build an analogy (a prim-
itive heuristics, see Ippoliti 2018; Ippoliti-Cellucci 
2016) and get a tentative solution (i.e. permutation of 
roots).
 (s4) Use this tentative solution as a basis for a generaliza-
tion (i.e. induction, that is, another primitive heuris-
tics) and, in that case, if needed, refine the hypothesis 
in order to apply it to all the cases.
The outcome of this heuristic chain is the very tentative 
hypothesis that the solution of polynomial equations is a 
function of permutations of radicals. Now, as we know ret-
rospectively, despite his success with polynomials of degree 
3 and 4, Lagrange was not able to achieve a similar result 
for polynomials of higher degree. But this was not his fault: 
Abel’s famous negative result (Abel 1824) showed that a 
‘quintic’ formula for the general fifth degree polynomial is 
impossible to find and the same holds for equations of higher 
degree. Nevertheless, “Lagrange’s introduction of permuta-
tions into the picture was the first significant step forward 
in the study of algebraic solvability in centuries” (Barnett 
2017, p. 23).
In effect, the inferential microstructure introduced by 
Lagrange has borne fruit. First, Abel’s proof is based just 
on the concept of permutation introduced by Lagrange. 
Second, the attempt of classifying the equations by means 
of solvability by radicals enabled Evariste Galois not only 
to introduce the term group (‘groupe’ in French), but also to 
construct the so-called ‘group of permutations’, which shape 
Galois theory. In turn, Galois’ work on permutation groups 
provided the basis, and a specific instance, for a more gen-
eral group concept as the one developed by Cayley (1854).
2.2  The Developments of Cauchy, Galois and Cayley
As often happens in history of mathematics, a failure not 
only is not fatal13, but it can also provide a basis for building 
new knowledge. In effect, even if the heuristic chain s1–s4 
built by Lagrange did not succeed, part of it, namely the 
inferential microstructure that moulded it (the idea of per-
mutations of radicals), was used in different ways in math-
ematical problem-solving.
Cauchy explicitly developed Lagrange’s microstruc-
ture and in a sense he made it an autonomous subject (see 
Cauchy 1815): in his works he does not deal with polyno-
mial equations, but puts forward a systematic treatment of 
the algebraic properties of permutations.
In more detail, Cauchy applies Lagrange’s idea (i.e. the 
number of distinguishable forms that result from permuting 
the variables in an expression is potential tool in studying 
algebraic solvability) more generally to any function of n 
variables, not simply to formulas for the roots of a resolvent 
equation. Basically, he tries to solve the following problem: 
“for a given number n of variables, what can be said about 
the possible number of distinct forms which a function of 
n variables can produce under permutations of those vari-
ables?” (Barnett 2010, p. 25).
In order to solve it, Cauchy introduces a new and bet-
ter notation14 for permutations, similar to a table of func-
tion values.15 Endowed with such a new symbolism, he can 
introduce and, later, better study, the notion of composition 
of permutations and its properties (see Cauchy 1845). This 
opens the way to the construction and study of a system of 
permutations, today known as a permutation group.
13 On this point see for instance (Gillies 1995; Ippoliti 2016). A 
recent interesting account is the one described by Fisch (2017), who 
deals with George Peacock’s struggles that also ultimately failed but 
that, again, proved heuristically crucial in helping others to develop a 
new branch of mathematics.
14 I won’t discuss here another very interesting, crucial issue emerg-
ing from this case study, that is, the heuristic role of notation (e.g. 
notation allows generality, permits a useful polysemy, makes calcula-
tion possible, etc.), and in particular the way it allows problems to be 
solved and posed.
15 Permutation here denotes the change of one arrangement (say abc) 
to another arrangement (e.g. acb)—in modern terms, we would say 
that it is a function that maps one set of entities (in this case, the let-
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Thus, while Lagrange introduces the concept of a per-
mutation to deal with the algebraic solution of polynomial 
equations, Cauchy treats permutations as algebraic objects 
in their own right, and, in turn, this enables Galois and, 
later, Cayley to use permutations to construct respectively 
the notion of group and its abstract version.
Galois (1831) is the first one to use the word group in 
algebra. At the beginning, this term has an informal and 
ambiguous meaning: group initially occurs in the notion 
of group of permutations (groupe de permutations). In this 
context, group means collection or set in the loose sense of 
the word and Galois does not specify it or define it better. In 
more detail, Galois’ idea is to consider a set and transforma-
tions from a set to itself that are invertible, so in this sense he 
is following Lagrange. On the other hand, Galois extends the 
heuristic reasoning of Lagrange and Cauchy by looking for 
the internal structure of a group of permutations as a way of 
controlling the solvability of the equation. Of course, Galois 
deals with groups of permutations, and not abstract groups, 
nonetheless, he looks at certain structural aspects of these 
groups that are isomorphism-invariant in our, modern, sense 
and that are independent of the particular action. Galois’ 
theory applies to the roots of any polynomial, not just the to 
the cases where the roots are the variables and precisely in 
this sense he goes beyond Lagrange.
The permutation group is one of the explicit starting point 
of Cayley’s theory of group—even if he makes it clear that 
he considers other objects and operations (e.g. quaternion 
imaginaries and their multiplication): “the idea of a group 
as applied to permutations or substitutions is due to Galois, 
and the introduction of it may be considered as marking an 
epoch in the progress of the theory of algebraic equations” 
(Cayley 1854, p. 124).
Another phenomenon that shaped the construction of the 
abstract notion of group in Cayley’s works is not strictly 
mathematical in kind, as it comes from physics, namely 
geometrical optics (Cayley 1857). In particular, “Cayley’s 
unexpected discovery of a non-abelian group of order 6 in 
the practical context of geometrical optics, served as the 
trigger for generalizing the group concept” (Chakraborty 
and Chowdhury 2005, p. 278). In more detail, this advance-
ment was suggested by “Cayley’s discovery of the six 
transformations that leave the equation of the secondary 
caustic unchanged, and his realization that these transfor-
mations form a group under the composition of mappings” 
(Chakraborty and Chowdhury 2005, p. 277). A caustic is a 
curve related to the reflection (or refraction) of light of a sur-
face in the study of optics and this second, concrete, instance 
of a non-abelian group of order six suggested a generaliza-
tion of the group concept beyond that of permutation group.
This shows how the assimilation of entities belonging to 
different domains was essential for the construction of the 
notion of group.
Cayley provides us with the first attempt of defining 
the modern, abstract,16 concept of group. In particular, he 
writes: “a set of symbols 1, α, β,. . ., all of them different, and 
such that the product of any two of them (no matter in what 
order), or the product of any one of them into itself, belongs 
to the set, is said to be a group” (Cayley 1854, p. 124). In 
this sense, he produces “a remarkable conceptual novelty in 
mathematics, the birth of one of the most essential concepts 
of modern mathematics” (Pengelley 2005, p. 7). In effect, 
Cayley treats 1, α, β,. .. as completely abstract symbols—not 
simply permutations, quaternions, invertible matrices under 
multiplication, Gauss’ quadratic forms, elliptic functions nor 
any other concrete instance of an operation. Consequently, 
any theorem that can be deduced from the properties stated 
in this definition will necessarily apply to every particular 
system that satisfies those properties.
Provided with this new explicit concept, Cayley is in a 
position to advance knowledge and problem-solving in alge-
bra. For instance, the core of his work (1854) is the clas-
sification of groups of finite order according to their form. 
He shows that all groups of prime order p have the same 
form as the cyclic group, thus providing a classification for 
groups of prime order p, namely, that there is essentially 
only one group of order p for any given prime p. Moreover, 
he determines all the groups of orders 4 and 6, showing that 
there are exactly two of each.
In this sense the notion of group enables a classification 
of mathematical entities. More generally, the result obtained 
by Cayley shows the heuristic role of a new concept.
First, it provides a generalisation and unification of 
properties and entities. It makes a domain more compact 
by giving a unified treatment of previously heterogeneous 
mathematical entities. As a consequence, it boosts math-
ematical problem-solving, since a more general concept 
can be used to approach distinct entities, and local results 
and techniques can be transferred from one kind of entity to 
another kind—for instance from elliptic functions to invert-
ible matrices. Thus it also provides a way of classifying enti-
ties and, accordingly, of seeking and establishing relations 
among them.
Moreover, it opens lines of research. For instance, the 
context of Cayley’s work seemed to suggest the he was 
thinking of finite groups and so it was not clear if his results 
could hold also for infinite groups. This line of research was 
fruitful, as, in effect, later a formal proof of it was produced 
also for infinite groups.
16 Cayley did not coin the term and notion of abstract group, as it 
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Last but not least, it enables an abstraction that may end 
up with an axiomatization, as happened just with the con-
struction of the abstract theory of groups.
3  The Role of Inferential Microstructures
The inferential process that led generations of mathematics, 
as we have seen, to construct the group concept required an 
assimilation17 of different entities, i.e. invertible matrices, 
permutations, Gauss’ quadratic forms, quaternions, various 
kinds of elliptic functions and caustics. This assimilation 
is based on an integration of pieces of knowledge coming 
from different fields and it shows how a conceptual novelty 
or change takes place in mathematics. Not only this assimi-
lation generates a new object—the notion of group—but it 
also brings to light new features of already known objects by 
means of gradual steps that remodel these entities by adding 
pieces of information, that is, properties and relations, to 
them. In effect, the notions of permutation, matrix, or elliptic 
function are different from what they were before the con-
struction of the notion of group: their properties, relation and 
inter-relation have changed, and moulded, in a new way and 
can serve new purposes in mathematical problem-solving.
Moreover, this example shows us, on one hand, that Laka-
tos’ account of conceptual novelty and change is defective, 
and, on the other, that the more recent accounts (in particular 
see Grozholz, Cellucci) make better sense of the process.
Lakatos’s seminal analysis of mathematical conceptual 
novelty (Lakatos 1976) focuses on proof-generated concepts, 
that is, ones based on the ‘dialectics’ between proofs and 
refutations. On one hand, Lakatos’ analysis really grasps 
a way mathematical knowledge is advanced. On the other 
hand, such an analysis cannot account for the inferential, 
informal and rational work before the proof or the refutation, 
which is essential to understand how a mathematical novelty 
is introduced and, eventually, a theorem proved. In effect, 
Lakatos account cannot fully explain how the concept of 
group is introduced since it requires Lagrange’s heuristics, 
and this involves the idea of studying the action of a struc-
ture on itself, which is not a part of a proof or a refutation. 
Moreover, Lakatos cannot fully explain the developments 
of Cauchy, Galois and Cayley, which use part of Lagrange’s 
heuristics (s1–s4) and do not start from a well-established 
result, namely a proof (a theorem) or refutation.
Instead, this case study fits well with Grosholz’s and Cel-
lucci’s accounts of mathematical novelty, as these accounts 
shed light on the inferential, informal and rational work 
before a proof or a refutation can be found.
On one hand, Emily Grosholz has showed that the 
employment of “modes of representation is typical of rea-
soning in mathematics” (Grosholz 2007, p. 4), and that the 
key to solving problems is not to “eliminate modes of repre-
sentation”, but to “multiply and juxtapose them” since “this 
often creates […] productive ambiguity” (Ibid., xii). The 
construction of the mathematical group concept, as we have 
seen, required the integration of several representations, for 
instance a geometric and algebraic one. The formation of a 
new representation is a step-by-step process, which high-
lights certain features of the entity and neglects others. This 
construction, when successful, creates an information sur-
plus that enables the solution of the problem. Moreover, as 
the case of the group concepts shows, the ambiguity of the 
term employed can play a heuristic role, since the multi-
faced aspect of an ambiguous concept, like that of ‘group’, 
enables the transfer of pieces of knowledge from one repre-
sentation to another one. Of course, such a concept can be 
defined more precisely later and can have a more specific 
content, expressed even in an axiomatic fashion. So, the con-
struction of a new representation might end up with a result 
that formalizes a kind of isomorphism or reduction between 
mathematical entities.
The fruitfulness of this process does not stop here. As 
a new representation is constructed and a result from it is 
proved in a given domain, it can be employed to deal with 
problems in other parts of mathematical knowledge, and so 
on, in a virtuous circle. That is the case of the concept of 
group and its abstract version, which is employed to solve 
problems in other mathematical domains and even in empiri-
cal scientific fields, like quantum mechanics.
On the other hand, Cellucci’s account of conceptual nov-
elty focuses on the role of ampliative inferences in the for-
mation of a hypothesis to solve a problem: “hypotheses are 
obtained by non-deductive rules, rather than by deductive 
rules” since “non-deductive rules are ampliative, namely, 
the conclusion is not contained in the premisses” (Cellucci 
2017, p. 154). In effect, the construction of the group con-
cept required analogies in order to be put forward and be 
successful. The problem that triggered the formation of the 
group concept was changed and then solved with several 
heuristic reasoning: Lagrange’s seminal heuristics, which 
produced the hypothesis that solution of polynomial equa-
tions is a function of permutations of radicals, was later 
refined and adjusted by Cauchy, Galois and Cayley.
What my analysis of the genesis and development of the 
notion of group shows more than these accounts is the fun-
damental role played by inferential micro-structures, that is, 
the search for similarities and local regularities. In effect, 
these micro-structures provide the building blocks that 
erect and shape the content of the conclusion of a amplia-
tive inference.
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The term ‘microstructures’ aims at highlighting the fact 
that they are proto-inferences: they provide a specific content 
for an ampliative inference, but they lack a sufficient level of 
generality, i.e. they do not allow obtaining a conclusion that 
is general in kind. Moreover, their content is not structured, 
that is, there is no hierarchical relation with other concept, 
as they basically are a way of searching for associations or 
correlations to refine.
Bottom line: they occur at a ‘micro’ level, that is, one 
that precedes the construction of a proper ampliative infer-
ence, and they provide the first, tentative, content of what 
later can be better structured, extended or refined as a more 
robust hypothesis.
The study of microstructures sheds light on the way 
pieces of information are introduced into the target of a 
problem and that the target did not contain at the beginning 
of the process. This information, which can take the form 
of new stipulations, functions, entities, not contained in the 
target at the beginning of the process of assimilation that 
shapes the construction of inferential microstructures. Since 
micro-structures are constructed by looking for properties 
of entities to assimilate, as we have seen with Lagrange’s 
heuristics, they provide the basis for the construction both of 
new representations and of heuristic rules, such as analogies. 
Once an analogy is created, it can evolve in several ways: it 
might become a partial isomorphism, a kind of reduction, 
or even an identity.
Now, in order to build similarities, we need compara-
ble aspects, and this in turn requires a certain viewpoint 
to compare things. This means that the way we represent 
things is essential to find possible similarities upon which 
to build plausible heuristic inferences. It is worth noting that 
the choice of a viewpoint is not arbitrary, as it is suggested 
by the features of the problem that we are trying to solve. It 
follows that first step in building a heuristic line of argument 
is the manipulation of the entities involved in the problems, 
a change of their representation, that is, adapting or chang-
ing them to serve a given purpose or advantage, even if it 
requires to neglect several features of the original entity.
The search for similarities in problems at the frontier of 
knowledge most of the time cannot be approached with met-
ric or probabilistic measures of similarities. A numerical 
evaluation of similarities between entities, or of relevance of 
similarity, is hard to realize: theories of similarities, theories 
of relevance, or theories of typicality do no offer a cogent 
basis for analogical inference and heuristic reasoning (see 
Ippoliti 2006). The similarities, and the tentative content that 
they provide, have to be judged and weighed on a qualita-
tive, case-by-case basis, but this does not limit the role of 
micro-structures.
The inferential microstructure, by looking for entities to 
assimilate, might lead us to novel entities, just like math-
ematical group, or even a new theory—algebraic topology 
is a paramount example in this sense (see Ippoliti 2016). The 
assimilation requires an integration of pieces of informa-
tion belonging to several domains. This means that a new, 
emerging object is both unitary and multi-faced, and each 
‘face’ can be used to solve a specific problem o sub-problem: 
the very same entity embeds different contents, the ones 
coming from different domains merged in it. As these faces, 
or pieces of information, contribute to the construction of 
these entities (are part of it), they ease the production of new 
representations, which in turn enable the manufacturing of 
new analogies and ampliative inferences. Similarities offer 
a basis for new representations and ampliative inferences, 
and these, in turn, offer a basis for properties or entities to 
be included in formal proofs.
So from similarities to theorems, the manufacturing of 
mathematical groups shows us the rational and inferential 
path that builds a novel concept, a path that starts with infer-
ential microstructures that are revised and refined in order 
to pose, change and solve problems, and ends up with a new 
theorem or theory, even an axiomatic one such as abstract 
group theory.
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